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Abstract 
The provision of financial incentives to local communities by energy developers has attracted 
cynicism across many localities, with some suggesting such community benefits are akin to 
‘bribery.’ The current study used an experimental design embedded within a community 
postal survey to explore whether potentially damaging effects of bribery rhetoric upon local 
support for a wind farm can be overcome through: i) portraying community benefits as a 
policy requirement (rather than a discretionary gesture by developers); and/or ii) the 
deployment of different discursive strategies by developers to manage their stake in the 
outcome of the project. Participants told about community benefits as being a policy 
requirement showed significantly higher support for the wind farm, an effect that was 
mediated by heightened perceptions of individually and collectively favourable outcomes 
from the development. We discuss our results in relation to their implications for government 
policy approaches to promoting renewable energy supply.  
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Community benefits or community bribes? An experimental analysis of strategies for 
managing community perceptions of bribery surrounding the siting of renewable 
energy projects 
 
Renewable energy technologies are anticipated to comprise an increasingly large 
share of the global energy mix over the coming decades (International Energy Agency [IEA], 
2014). The advantages of expanding the use of renewable energy technologies include the 
potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improve air quality and enhance energy 
security (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2011). In particular, it is 
anticipated that there will be strong future growth rates in the development of offshore wind 
technologies across a number of countries and regions (Department for Energy and Climate 
Change [DECC], 2010; Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy [EERE], 2014; 
The European Wind Energy Association [EWEA], 2011; O’Keeffe & Haggett, 2012; 
Makridis, 2013). However, historically, the deployment of wind energy technologies has 
been shaped by a plethora of social, economic and political circumstances (Devine-Wright, 
2011; Petrova, 2013). For instance, rates of local ownership, differential planning systems 
and the influence of landscape protection organisations are just a few factors that can 
influence the installation of wind farms (Toke, Breukersm & Wolsink, 2008). 
It is well documented that public support or opposition is one potential factor that 
might shape deployment rates of wind energy (e.g. Devine-Wright, 2007). Yet in many 
instances there appears to be a paradox in public support for wind energy. Higher levels of 
opposition to wind energy developments have often been observed at a local level, with much 
higher support being found at a broader, national level (Bell, Gray, Haggett & Swaffield, 
2013; Jones & Eiser 2010). The reasons behind these ‘heightened’ levels of opposition within 
a localised context are contested. The explanation that has typically received the most 
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attention classifies local opponents to wind energy developments as ‘NIMBYs’ (Not In My 
Back Yard). These are individuals who may claim to support wind energy yet oppose any 
such developments in their local area due to concerns over impacts on personal utility. It is 
now widely argued that NIMBYism theories are an overly simplistic representation of the 
nature of local opposition towards wind energy developments (e.g. see Petrova, 2013). For 
example, local perceptions of wind farm developments can also be shaped by concerns over 
procedural and distributive justice (e.g. Gross, 2007), place attachment (Devine-Wright, 
2009) and ‘qualified support arguments’ (whereby individuals’ support for wind farms at a 
broad level is based upon conditionalities that might have been infringed upon within a 
localised context) (Jones & Eiser, 2010). Moreover, studies have shown that the development 
of relationships between wind farm developers and communities, particularly in facilitating 
trust and reciprocity, is also a factor that commonly shapes local attitudes towards wind farms 
(Hall, Ashworth & Devine-Wright, 2013).  
As a result of such local opposition to the siting of renewable energy projects, an 
increasing focus has been placed on the identification and evaluation of strategies that might 
help to raise local support for wind energy developments (and so-called ‘locally undesirable’ 
energy generation facilities in general) (e.g. Hall et al., 2013; Peel & Lloyd, 2007; Strachan, 
Lal & Malmborg, 2006). In many countries it has become common for energy developers to 
provide voluntary offers of community benefit packages that provide payments to local 
communities affected by wind energy developments (e.g. see Clean Energy Council, 2012; 
NextEra Energy, 2014; RenewableUK, 2013). In the UK, commercial wind farm developers 
usually provide these community benefits through the form of a community benefit fund, 
which is then managed and spent by an organisation accountable to the local community. 
Community benefit packages can be used to finance a diverse array of initiatives ranging 
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from benefits at an individual/household level (e.g. reduced energy bills) through to 
community-wide schemes (e.g. supporting local clubs).  
However, cynicism vis-à-vis developers’ underlying motives for providing these 
community funds has often emerged. In the UK, community benefits have regularly been 
portrayed and seen as an attempt by local developers to ‘bribe’ local communities in order to 
‘buy’ support for their wind farm development and ease the passage through the planning 
process (e.g. see Aitken (2010), Cass, Walker & Devine-Wright (2010), Walker, Wiersma & 
Bailey (2014) for fuller discussions of this). An illustrative example of this can be clearly 
shown within article headlines written in two major national UK newspapers: “Wind farm 
developers resorting to 'little short of bribery” (The Telegraph, 2012) and “Great green 
bribe: Say Yes to a windfarm in your neighbourhood and get 20% off your power bill” (Daily 
Mail, 2013)i. The portrayal of compensatory payments by energy developers as bribery has 
also been salient in relation to other energy developments such as hydraulic fracturing sites 
(e.g. see The Independent, 2014). Thus, it is unclear at present whether the provision of 
community benefits is able to increase local support for wind farms in situations where these 
critical bribery perspectives are also prominent across local communities.  
This paper seeks to establish whether there might be particular conditions under 
which the provision of community benefits can enhance local support for wind energy 
developments, particularly in a context in which bribery rhetoric has been made salient. 
Specifically, it tests whether institutionalising community benefits (making community 
benefits a policy requirement) and the discursive deployment of stake management strategies 
by developers (e.g. whether developers deny or confess that community benefits are provided 
to help achieve commercial ends) can prevent the portrayal of community benefits as bribes 
from undermining local support for an offshore wind farm. In pursuing this aim, this research 
provides valuable wider insight as to how the provision of community benefits and 
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compensatory payments that often accompanies locally unpopular energy facilities might be 
most effectively designed and discussed.  
 
Community Benefits and Local Support for Wind Farms 
There has been a tacit assumption by policy makers and energy developers that the 
provision of community benefits will help to foster local support for wind farms (Cowell, 
Bristow & Munday, 2011, 2012). This assumption has been called into question by a small 
body of research that has examined public perceptions of community benefits. Both Cass et 
al. (2010) and Aitken (2010) found that critical viewpoints regarding the reasons why 
developers provide community benefits were commonplace among local publics and that 
these critical viewpoints can undermine the ability of community benefits to be associated 
with heightened support for energy projects 
The studies by Cass et al. (2010) and Aitken (2010) showed a number of reasons that 
potentially appeared to underpin the cynicism associated with community benefits. Focus 
groups conducted by Cass et al. (2010) found participants to frequently question the likely 
scale of community benefits that developers would provide to local people. Additionally, 
focus groups participants appeared to have low levels of trust in energy developers and often 
questioned the underlying reasons for why community benefits were provided. Some 
participants felt that developers might provide community benefits for ‘PR reasons’ and 
many felt that they were being provided as ‘sweeteners’ or ‘bribes’, a viewpoint that the 
authors found energy developers to be very aware of, and concerned about, in separate 
interviews. Similarly, Aitken (2010), focusing upon a Scottish case study over a five year 
period, found that community benefits were a continuing, controversial issue. Concerns were 
raised by the local community about the underlying motives behind the provision of 
community benefits as well as how the funds are spent.  
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Walker et al. (2014) conducted an experimental analysis of the relationships between 
community benefit provision and local support for a potential offshore wind farm. The 
authors looked at the impact of different framings of community benefits. Communication 
framing relates to the way in which speech, text, images and other presentation methods are 
used to convey information to others, most classically through putting a ‘spin’ on particular 
issues (see Druckman 2001). The study provided participants with one of three framing 
conditions: a no-framed condition that provided details of a potential wind farm but no 
information on community benefits; a community benefit framing condition informing  
participants of the likely community benefits that would accompany a wind farm 
development; or a dual framing condition that presented participants with details of 
community benefits but also that these had been construed by some as an attempt by 
developers to bribe local communities. Those exposed to the community benefit frame had 
significantly higher levels of support for the wind farm, compared to those in the no-framed 
condition and the dual framing condition. This demonstrates that the salience of bribery 
rhetoric can undermine any increased local support for a wind farm that might otherwise have 
been accrued through the provision of community benefits. 
Indeed Cass et al. (2010), Aitken (2010), Cowell et al. (2011) and Walker et al. (2014) 
all express doubts that community benefits are likely to increase local support for a wind 
farm, particularly given that residents are often cynical about the motives behind the 
provision of community benefits. Echoing wider research on attitudes to energy projects as a 
whole (discussed previously), it appears that perceptions of community benefits have 
complex associations with public trust in developers, perceived fairness and individual 
perceptions of benefit for themselves and the community as a whole (Aitken 2010; Cowell et 
al. 2011; Walker et al. 2014). In light of this, the current research seeks to move this 
important debate forward by testing whether purposive strategies can prevent cynical 
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perspectives of community benefits from undermining local support for wind farms. The first 
of these that we examine is whether institutionalising community benefits as a government 
requirement might result in community benefits leading to increased local support for wind 
farms, even when bribery rhetoric is salient. 
Institutionalising Community Benefits 
A community benefit package that is provided by developers on a discretionary basis 
may always be met with a large amount of scepticism (Aitken, 2010).  As such, Aitken 
(2010) has suggested that institutionalising community benefits might help to overcome 
common perceptions that community benefits are akin to ‘bribes.’ Aitken argues that, under 
an institutionalised scheme, the funds will more likely be acknowledged as a routine part of 
wind farm development, rather than an attempt to ensure a successful planning outcome. If 
developers were required to provide a certain level of community benefits then local 
community members might see these as developers as complying with policy rather than  
purposely trying to buy local acceptability. Conversely, it is also important to consider that a 
potential risk of institutionalising community benefits is that individuals could still see these 
as an attempted bribe, but simply as a bribe from the government rather than wind farm 
developers. 
Institutionalising community benefits could feasibly enhance public perceptions of 
how beneficial a wind farm development will be on a personal level (perceptions of personal 
benefit) or at a community wide level (perceptions of benefit for the community) (see Walker 
et al. 2014 for a similar categorisation). Studies within the fields of behavioural economics 
and social psychology have shown that individuals’ perceptions of benefit and loss can be 
shaped through framing, despite there being no change in the absolute levels of benefit or loss 
(e.g. Tverksy & Kahnemann, 1981).	In relation to community benefits, local community 
members might doubt that ‘profit seeking’ developers have the interests of local people at 
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heart and thus be sceptical about whether discretionary community benefit gestures will 
secure a good deal for local community members. Conversely, policy makers might be 
viewed as acting in the interests of local communities and pursuing social objectives. Thus 
institutionalised community benefits may be associated with securing a better deal for 
community members (although the UK public also seems to be getting more distrustful of 
politicians and governments (Park, Bryson, Clery, Curtice & Phillips, 2013)). Indeed, there 
appears to be an increasingly prominent attitude within the UK public that a key role of 
government is to ‘stand up’ to big business (e.g. see YouGov 2015). If community benefits 
are mandatory then it may also be that individuals are more likely to believe that these will 
actually be delivered than when developers claim they will voluntarily provide them. 
Moreover, a standardised and institutionalised system of benefit provision may also have the 
further advantage of avoiding a perception on behalf of the local community that a developer 
is being particularly generous in their case because the outcomes of the specific development 
in question will be very high return for the developer but very high cost to the local 
community. Thus, changing the motivational parameters surrounding the provision of 
community benefits could shape perceptions of how beneficial these community benefits will 
likely be at both an individual and community-wide level. 
Consequently, the current study examines the effect that institutionalising community 
benefits might have upon local support for a wind farm, including when competing bribery 
rhetoric is made salient. Specifically, the following hypothesis is tested:  
 
H1: Community benefits are more likely to increase support for wind farms when they are 
portrayed as a policy requirement rather than a voluntary gesture.  
Importantly, given the above discussion, this research also contributes to emerging 
debates around community benefits through exploring the underlying reasons why 
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institutionalising community benefits might enhance local support for wind farms. We utilise 
mediational analysis to explore whether perceptions of ‘developer bribery’, ‘government 
bribery’, ‘perceptions of benefit for the community’ and/or ‘perceptions of personal benefit’ 
explain why institutionalised community benefits might be associated with heightened 
support for a wind farm (see Methods section for more details). 
Stake Management Strategies 
Wind farm developers face an important challenge in deciding how to portray their 
potentially ‘vested interests’ when providing and communicating community benefits. 
Communications from developers with regards to how beneficial a wind farm will be for a 
community might be discounted or dismissed by local residents if they believe that the 
developer has a vested interest in them believing that story. Subsequently, the use of 
discursive ‘stake management’ strategies by developers may offer the opportunity to tackle 
perceptions of bribery. In particular, we focus on three potential ‘stake management’ 
strategies (stake confession, stake inoculation and no stake proclamation strategies) that 
developers might employ when communicating community benefit funds.  
A well-established discursive strategy that developers might employ is that of stake 
inoculation (e.g. Antaki & Wetherell, 1999; McGuire, 1964; Whittle & Mueller, 2011). This 
occurs when an actor attempts to rebut or counter any possible criticisms that may surround 
their motives behind pursuing a particular course of action. For instance, studies by both 
Cowell et al. (2011) and Cass et al. (2010) conducted interviews with wind farm developers 
and reported that these actors rebuffed any suggestions that community benefits are a form of 
bribery. Developers were very alert to the potential for cynical interpretations of community 
benefits to emerge and of the damage these can do in local debates and politics (Cass et al., 
2010). Developers were resolute that the provision of community benefits was driven by 
‘good’, intrinsic motivations and their desire to be a ‘good neighbour’ (Cowell et al., 2011; 
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Cass et al., 2010). The wider literature on framing and persuasion does provide some 
indication that such a stake inoculation strategy might be effective in some instances. For 
example, studies have shown that an actor’s argument can actually be stronger when it 
challenges and successfully refutes opposing arguments, rather than if it were unchallenged 
(i.e. it is more effective in a context of a two-sided argument rather than a one-sided 
argument) (e.g. Allen, 1998; Druckman, 2011). Although, what makes one argument or frame 
stronger than a competing one is largely unknown at present (Druckman 2011). Thus, it 
remains unclear as to whether the deployment of stake inoculation strategies is actually likely 
to be the most effective strategy for developers to manage the bribery rhetoric that often 
surrounds the provision of community benefits.  
 In many instances the underlying stake behind a particular course of action might be 
so salient that trying to inoculate or ignore this is an inadequate strategy (Potter, 1996). 
Therefore, an organisation might employ ‘transparency’ and confess their stake when 
pursuing a particular action (stake confession). This approach might involve an attempt by an 
actor to pre-empt criticism through portraying ‘honesty’ and simply admitting that they have 
an underlying interest when pursuing a course of action (Potter, 1996). In employing a stake 
confession strategy, a wind farm developer might confess that they are providing community 
benefits in order to make the development acceptable for local communities to enhance their 
chances of receiving planning permission. This may help a wind farm developer to be 
perceived as more honest. Indeed, perceptions of procedural justice, of which transparency is 
one core aspect (Levanthal, 1980; Lind and Tyler, 1988), have been identified as an 
important determinant of individual attitudes towards renewable energy developments 
(Aitken, 2010b; Walker et al., 2010; Wolsink, 2007).   
Alternatively, a firm might adopt a ‘no stake proclamation’ strategy. Arguably the 
most prominent message within the emerging field of corporate social responsibility 
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communication is that it may be in the best interests of businesses to not communicate their 
socially responsible efforts (Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010; Morsing, Schultz & Nielsen, 2008; 
Schlegelmilch & Pollach, 2005). The argument here is that any attempt to communicate 
socially responsible actions can breed cynicism and suspicion by customers and stakeholders 
given it is in a firm’s self-interest to be seen as socially responsible. Instead, it is common for 
companies to embody the principle of being socially responsible but choose to avoid 
communicating socially responsible initiatives and instead depend on others to talk about 
these (Kotler & Lee 2005; Lindgreen & Swaen 2010). Thus, it might be most effective for 
developers to adopt a ‘no stake proclamation’ discursive strategy and not provide any 
communications with regards to the provision of community benefits. In light of the above 
discussions, the current study explores whether energy developers might be best placed in 
adopting ‘stake confession’ or ‘no stake proclamation’ strategies, rather than the current 
tendency to employ ‘stake inoculation’ strategies.  
 Finally, it is plausible that the effectiveness of discursive strategies may depend upon 
whether community benefits are perceived as being an institutionalised requirement or a 
voluntary act by wind farm developers. It seems feasible that discursive strategies by 
developers will only have an effect when community benefits are provided on a voluntary 
basis. For instance, statements from developers regarding their motives for providing 
community benefits might be seen as irrelevant if the provision of community benefits is seen 
as complying with government legislation. Thus, a further hypothesis to be tested is:  
H2: Stake disclosure communications will only affect support when community benefits are 
presented as discretionary gestures by energy developers rather than required under 
government policy. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
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The study was implemented within the area of Torbay, UK. Torbay is a popular 
tourist destination in the South West of the UK that is characterised by having an east facing 
natural harbour and is a popular tourist destination. The UK provides a useful context for this 
study as it is a country where the provision of community benefits is commonplace and 
‘bribery’ debates surrounding these have become salient across a number of UK communities 
(e.g. see Walker et al., 2014). A mailbox survey of 1,750 households was conducted in the 
Torbay towns of Paignton and Torquay. This represented 3.5% of households within the 
sampled area (Census, 2011). Torbay was sampled as it was deemed a good location for 
exploring support for an offshore wind farm in an ‘upstream context’ (see Walker et al., 
2010) as there were no publically available plans to develop an offshore wind farm in the 
local area, although participants were made aware that ‘it is not impossible that one [offshore 
wind farm] could be proposed in the area at some point in the future.’ Such a location was 
targeted because it is increasingly recognised that developers should engage with local 
communities at an earlier stage in planning processes, whereas at later stages in the 
development process local views towards a development could feasibly be more deep-rooted. 
Surveys, 4 sides of A4 paper in length, were hand delivered, together with a pre-paid 
envelope. A prize draw incentive was included to help boost participation (see Dillman 
(2000) and Anseel et al (2010)). 
 A fractional, between-subjects factorial design was used in this study (see Box, 
Hunter & Hunter (2005) for more information on fractional factorial designs). All 
participants received basic information about a hypothetical future wind farm in the area of 
Torbay, United Kingdom. However, using random allocation through mixing up all 
questionnaires prior to putting them in envelopes, participants were exposed to one of seven 
framing conditions that determined the information they received about the likely provision 
of community benefits alongside any potential wind farm (see online appendix for details of 
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framing text). Participants were made aware that the researchers had no knowledge of any 
current plans to develop a wind farm in the local area. The design of the study tested whether 
the mechanism behind the provision of community benefits (institutionalised vs voluntary) 
and discursive stake management strategies (stake confession vs stake inoculation vs no stake 
proclamation) could influence local support for a wind farm development. Additionally, a no-
framed condition (control group) was included as a seventh framing condition. 
A total of 236 participants responded to the postal survey. Seven surveys were 
incomplete, leaving 229 responses (representing a 13.1% response rate) suitable for analysis. 
There was a good spread of participants across the framing conditions with each of the seven 
framing conditions receiving between 29 - 38 completed responses. The age of participants 
ranged between 18 and 80 years old, with there being an average age of 52.2 years old (SD = 
15.0). Of participants that stated their age (n=210), 9.2% were aged under 30, 14.4% aged 30-
44, 37.6% aged 45-59, 25.8% aged 60-74 and 4.8% were aged 75 or over. In terms of the 
gender mix of the respondents, 54% were female. 141 participants (61.6%) believed humans 
were a substantial cause of climate change whilst 72 participants (31.4%) were sceptical of 
anthropogenic climate change (based on a categorisation method used by Bain et al. (2012)) – 
16 participants were unsure or preferred not to say (7%). There were no significant 
differences in age, gender, political ideology or climate change beliefs across the seven 
conditions (all p >.15). 
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were first exposed to a descriptive piece of text, which varied depending 
upon the framing condition that they received. The community benefit mechanism variable 
had two levels. Individuals were either informed that community benefits are voluntary 
contributions from wind farm developers, or were told that community benefits are provided 
by wind farm developers in order to comply with government guidance.  The stake 
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management variable contained three levels: i) stake confession, where a quote from a wind 
farm developer acknowledged that inevitably some will perceive community benefits to be 
bribes; ii) stake inoculation, whereby participants received a quote from a wind farm 
developer denying that community benefits are bribes and instead these funds are provided as 
they want to be ‘good neighbours’; and iii) no stake proclamation, whereby no statement 
from a wind farm developer was made with regards to claims of bribery. The developer 
quotes were extracts from interviews with wind farm developers conducted by Cass et al. 
(2010). All participants within the associated six framing conditions received information 
about community benefits that would likely accompany the wind farm and that these 
community benefits have been portrayed by some as an attempt to bribe local communities. 
 Participants who received the control group framing text only received information 
about a potential wind farm and were not told about community benefits or that these are 
described by some as an attempt to bribe local populations. This control group was 
incorporated within the research design to act as a reference point from which to test for any 
framing effects (see Chong and Druckman, 2007). Comparison to the control group enables 
the direct assessment of whether institutionalising community benefits or the deployment of 
stake management strategies can help community benefits to increase support for a wind 
farm, compared to a situation where information on these funds is not provided.  
After reading the framed information, participants completed a short survey. This 
measured participants’ support aforementioned for the wind farm development by averaging 
participants’ responses to two associated questions (Spearman-Brown r = .89). These items 
asked participants to rate how strongly they agreed with the statements ‘I would support such 
a development’ and ‘I would rather this development was not built in the Torbay area’ 
(reversed). Potential mediation variables of ‘developer bribery’ii (e.g. ‘I am cynical about the 
motives behind the provision of community benefits by wind farm developers’), ‘government 
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bribery’ (Spearman-Brown r = .65) (e.g. ‘I think that the government are trying to bribe 
communities to accept wind farms’), ‘perceptions of personal benefit’ (Spearman-Brown r = 
.74) (e.g. ‘such a development would bring me personal benefit’) and ‘perceptions of benefit 
for the community’ (Spearman-Brown r = .88) (e.g. ‘such a development would do more 
damage than good to my local community’[reversed]) were also measured within the survey 
using two-item measures to explore the underlying mechanisms driving any framing effects.  
 To analyse the results of the study, all statistical analysis was conducted using the 
macro ‘PROCESS’ (described by Hayes 2012, 2013). PROCESS is the most suitable test for 
analysing these results as it enabled the simultaneous analysis of multiple mediators and 
moderators. PROCESS was used to test for mediation of any effects across the ‘community 
benefit mechanism’ and ‘stake management’ independent variables upon support for the wind 
farm, as well as any interactions between these two variables. This involved dummy coding 
the independent variables and measuring any effects relative to the control group separately 
because, due to the incomplete factorial design, it was not possible to analyse the control 
group in the same model as the 3 x 2 factors. Participants’ age and perceptions of how 
trustworthy they believed a developer would likely be were included within the statistical 
model as covariates due to their strong, independent relationships with their support for the 
development.  
Results 
Figure 1 shows the estimated marginal mean levels of support for the wind farm 
across the control group (M = 4.15, S.E. = .31), institutional no stake proclamation (M = 5.12, 
S.E. = .34), institutional stake confession (M = 4.97, S.E. = .34), institutional stake 
inoculation (M = 4.74, S.E. = .33), voluntary no-stake proclamation (M = 4.44, S.E. = .30), 
voluntary stake confession (M = 4.50, S.E. = .33) and voluntary stake inoculation (M = 4.00, 
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S.E. = .33) framing conditions. The following sections set out the statistical analysis of these 
results.  
Effects of Community Benefit Mechanism (voluntary vs institutionalised)  
The results of the PROCESS mediational model (Figure 2) found that there was a 
significant increase in support for the developments amongst participants who received the 
institutionalised community benefit frames (total effect = .63, p = .014), relative to those in 
the voluntary community benefit framing groups [supporting H1]. This main effect 
diminished when the four potential mediators were simultaneously included within the model 
(direct effect of framing conditions = .12, p = .49) suggesting the presence of significant 
mediation. The model found that perceptions of personal benefit, with 95% bias-corrected 
bootstrap confidence intervals of .0903 to .4585, significantly mediated the effect of 
increased support under the institutionalised frame compared to the voluntary frame. 
Perceptions of benefit for the community (bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals of -
.0527 to .6047), perceptions of community benefits as political bribes (bias-corrected 
bootstrap confidence intervals of -.1253 to .0149) and perceptions of community benefits as 
developer bribes (bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals of -.0105 to .1515) did not 
mediate at a 95% confidence level. Table 1 also provides an overview of the correlations 
among the four meditational variables, control variables as well as the dependent variable. 
Tests indicated that multicollinearity was not a concern amongst the mediator variables 
(perceptions of personal benefit, Tolerance = .61, VIF = 1.64; perceptions of community 
benefit; Tolerance = .49, VIF = 2.01, perceptions of political bribery; Tolerance = .61, VIF = 
1.64; perceptions of developer bribery, Tolerance = .54, VIF = 1.84)iii.  
Additional mediational analysis shown in Figure 2 explored whether the 
institutionalised frame was also associated with significantly higher levels of support 
compared to a no-framed group that received no information about community benefits. 
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There was a significant, positive effect of the institutionalisation frame upon participants’ 
support for the wind farm (total effect = .79, p = .030), compared to the no-framed condition 
[supporting H1]. This effect dissipated once the mediators were incorporated within the 
model (direct effect of framing conditions = -.25, p = .27). Additionally, the statistical model 
found with 95% confidence that the increased support that occurred under the 
institutionalisation frame was mediated by perceptions of personal benefit, with a 95% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence interval of .0772 to .9069, and perceptions of benefit for the 
community, with a 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval of .1040 to 1.300. 
Perceptions of community benefits as bribes from politicians or developers were not included 
as mediators given that participants in the control group were not provided with any 
information about community benefits. 
There was not a significant difference in support between the frames that portrayed 
the provision of community benefits as a voluntary act and the no-framed condition (total 
effect = .19, p = .59).  
Effect of Stake Management Strategies upon support for the development 
The PROCESS model did not find any significant differences in support for the wind 
farm across the stake management framing conditions. Participants exposed to the stake 
confession strategy had similar levels of support to those exposed to the no stake 
proclamation strategies (total effect = .02, p = .95). The stake confession frames were 
associated with higher mean levels of support than the stake inoculation frames, however this 
was not significant at a 95% confidence level (total effect = .47, p = .127). The stake 
inoculation strategy was associated with less support for the wind farm than the no stake 
proclamation strategy, but not at a significant level (total effect = -.45, p = .15). The model 
did not find any significant indirect mediation across the stake management strategies by 
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perceptions of personal benefit, perceptions of benefit for the community, political bribery or 
developer bribery (all 95% confidence intervals included 0).  
Interactions between community benefit mechanisms and stake management strategies 
The effectiveness of the stake inoculation (p = .81), the stake confession (p = .72) and 
no stake proclamation (p = .89) framing conditions did not depend on whether the provision 
of community benefits was portrayed as being institutionalised or voluntary. Thus there were 
no significant interactions between the communicated mechanism behind the provision of 
community benefits and the discursive stake management strategies.  
Discussion 
Existing research has shown that community benefits are unlikely to increase local 
support for wind farm developments when critical, bribery perceptions are salient (Aitken, 
2010; Cass et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2014). However, importantly, the findings of the 
current research show that this need not necessarily be the case. The current findings show 
that it may be possible to implement strategies to ensure that the provision of community 
benefits can increase local support for offshore wind farms, even when these funds are 
portrayed by some within a local context as ‘bribes.’ Local community members who were 
told about institutionalised community benefits had significantly higher levels of support for 
a potential offshore wind farm compared to participants who did not receive information 
about community benefits and participants who were told that community benefits are a 
voluntary act by developers (as is currently the case in the UK). Consequently, this research 
provides empirical evidence in support of Aitken’s (2010) tentative suggestion that the 
institutionalisation of community benefits might help to prevent bribery perspectives of 
community benefits from affecting local perceptions of wind energy developments.   
 Importantly, there was little difference in support for the wind farm across 
participants who were told that the provision of community benefits accompanying a wind 
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farm was a discretionary act by developers and those in a control group that were not 
informed of any community benefits. This further reinforces the findings of Aitken (2010), 
Cass et al., (2010), Cowell et al., (2011) and Walker et al., (2014) who all infer that the 
voluntary provision of community benefits is unlikely to be associated with an increase in 
local support when competing ‘bribery’ perspectives of community benefits are salient. 
It can therefore be recommended on the basis of the findings of this research that 
efforts should be made to institutionalise community benefits or compensatory benefits that 
accompany locally unpopular energy developments. Greater consideration as to how this 
might be best achieved is required and, inevitably, will vary across localities and energy 
technologies. For instance, the form by which community benefits are provided (if at all) by 
wind energy developers varies greatly across countries (e.g. see Richardson et al., 2009). In 
countries such as Spain, Germany and Denmark, community benefits have historically been 
more institutionalised than they have been in the UK. Within these countries benefits to local 
communities have been ascertained through formal local taxation payments and opportunities 
for local ownership and thus ‘local dividends’, rather than through discretionary cash 
payments by developers (DTI, 2005). Movement towards the more formalised models 
utilised in these countries may offer opportunities to enhance local acceptability of wind 
farms in other national contexts. Notably, in recent years there has been an adoption of a 
voluntary ‘Community Benefits Protocol’ by some onshore wind farm developers in the UK 
(RenewableUK, 2013). The protocol sets out commitments from wind farm developers that 
are members of RenewableUK to offer a minimum of £5000 per megawatt of installed 
capacity. However, even with this protocol, community benefits remain a voluntary act and 
standards for community benefit provision for offshore wind farms are even less well 
established. The recommendations made here to institutionalise community benefits further 
may also not be as clear-cut as the results from this research might suggest. Greater 
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consideration about wider stakeholder views of such an approach and potential negative 
consequences (e.g. costs to developers and thus of energy production) have not been 
considered in this article and should be analysed going forward.  
It is also important to note that the research set out in this paper has important 
implications for wider theoretical research in the field of framing. Framing research has 
shown that portraying an object in a positive or negative light can influence individuals’ 
attitudes. For instance, public views of a hate rally can be significantly shaped depending on 
whether they are presented with positively (e.g. exercising rights to free speech) or negatively 
(e.g. rallies pose a risk to safety) framed information (e.g. Chong, 1993; Nelson, Clawson & 
Oxley, 1997). However, recent framing research has suggested that the simultaneous 
provision of opposing framing conditions (e.g. positive and negative frames) often neutralises 
any effects on individual attitudes that might have occurred through providing participants 
with an unchallenged frame (e.g. Aklin & Urpelainen 2013, Druckman 2011, Chong & 
Druckman 2013). Our research here has added to these existing debates in the academic 
literature by showing that strategies (institutionalising community benefits in this instance) 
can be developed to counteract any neutralising effects that the provision of opposing frames 
might have. Subsequently, the findings of this study suggest that a key, largely unexplored, 
challenge for framing researchers is to understand how strategies might be developed to 
overcome any negative effects of opposing framing conditions.  
Institutionalising Community Benefits and Perceptions of Benefit 
Mediational analyses also provided important insight in to why the institutionalised 
community benefit frames were associated with the highest levels of local support for a 
potential wind farm. It was expected that institutionalising community benefits might reduce 
participant perceptions of community benefits as bribes by developers, with these funds 
instead coming to be seen as developers complying with policy. However, perceptions of 
22	
	
developer bribery did not mediate the framing effects that were found. Instead, increased 
support under the institutionalised framing condition was mediated by heightened perceptions 
of how beneficial the wind farm would be at an individual level (compared to the control 
group and voluntary frames) and at a collective level (compared to the control group). 
Therefore, even though the material size or characteristics of community benefits did not 
change across the voluntary and institutionalised framing conditions, perceptions of how 
beneficial a wind farm would be did change. This might be because participants were 
sceptical that developers would be motivated by securing a good deal for local community 
members. Put simply, it seemed that when community benefit packages were offered up as 
voluntary acts on behalf of developers, community members became sceptical about whether 
the proposal, overall, would bring them (or their local community) net benefit—perhaps 
suggesting that they imagined that the negative impacts of the development must be very 
large. It also seems plausible that individuals might have higher expectations that community 
benefits will actually be fulfilled under an institutionalised context compared to when 
developers claim that they will voluntarily provide them. 
Stake Management Strategies 
This research did not find the implementation of discursive stake management 
strategies by wind farm developers to have an effect upon local support for the wind farm 
development. Nor did the effectiveness of stake management strategies significantly depend 
upon community benefits being portrayed as a voluntary goodwill gesture by developers 
[providing no support for H2]. Thus, no recommendations can be made in terms of how wind 
farm developers should seek to communicate their stake when providing community benefits. 
However, it is interesting to note that the lowest average support of the seven framing 
conditions was the one that presented community benefits as a voluntary gesture and exposed 
participants to stake inoculation rhetoric from developers. Ironically, this is currently the 
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most likely type of communication regarding a proposed local renewable energy 
development that individuals will be exposed to within the UK context. This situation is due 
to community benefits remaining a voluntary act and developers frequently being keen to 
dismiss that they are trying to buy the support of local communities, emphasising instead that 
they are trying to be ‘good neighbours’ (e.g. see Cass et al., 2010). Even though this effect 
fell short of statistical significance, experimentally analysing the effect of stake management 
strategies identified within the field of discursive psychology remains a useful cross-
disciplinary avenue for future research. 
Limitations and Future Research 
It is necessary to acknowledge some limitations to this research. Firstly, in conducting 
a study of this nature there is a clear need to ensure that the research design adheres to ethical 
standards. In this study efforts were made to avoid fabricating the information that was 
presented to participants. For example, actual quotes by wind farm developers were used 
rather than the fictitious quotes that we as researchers could otherwise have developed in a 
manner that would have more potently tested the hypotheses. This is particularly true for the 
stake confession manipulation whereby the framing text quoted a developer stated “wind 
farm developers acknowledged that it was inevitable that ‘somebody can say it’s bribing the 
local community.’ However, they stressed that these funds can provide ‘an awful lot of 
benefit’ to communities.” If the study were to have used fabricated developer quotes then 
there would have been the opportunity to develop a stronger manipulation of ‘stake 
confession.’ However due to ethical considerations this was deemed inappropriate to do in a 
postal survey as there were concerns that making participants aware of fabricated material in 
a debrief at the end of the postal survey could cause respondents to change their responses 
retrospectively. Another limitation is that participants were presented with details of a 
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hypothetical wind farm and thus their responses might be slightly less extreme than if they 
were provided with details of a real wind farm where the situation is of higher relevance. 
It is also possible to identify a number of potentially useful avenues for further 
research by recognising the limitations of the research design used in this paper. Firstly, it is 
important to acknowledge that conducting an experimental study of this type imposes some 
constraints upon one’s ability to understand the underlying reasons and psychological 
processes that underpin the mediational findings of this study. Future research that provides 
further exploration of these issues would be useful. This could explore the reasons that 
underpinned why institutionalising community benefits resulted in heightened perceptions of 
personal benefit. For example, it could be that policy makers are likely to be viewed as acting 
more in the interests of a local community than wind farm developers or people may believe 
community benefits are more likely to be delivered when they are a policy requirement. It is 
also possible that the size of some of the effects (e.g. the effects of stake management 
strategies) might have been of a magnitude that the current sample size was unable to detect 
at a level of statistical significance. Additionally, the current study has not explored whether 
different ways of developers offering ‘voluntary’ community benefits can impact upon local 
perceptions of energy developments. For example, Cowell et al. (2011) and Aitken (2010) 
suggest that community benefits might be more likely to influence local perceptions of a 
wind farm if community members feel that they are able to influence decision making with 
regards to the siting of the development. This is because local residents might be more likely 
to feel that community benefits have been a two-way negotiable process and offer the 
opportunity to agree a ‘good deal’ for the community. These more subtle variations in the 
provision of voluntary benefits represent potentially interesting areas for future research. 
Conclusion  
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The provision of community benefits by energy developers is common across a range 
of countries and energy technologies (e.g. DECC, 2013; Idemudia & Ite, 2006; NextEra 
Energy, 2014). It is of clear importance to understand the effects (if any) that the provision of 
such community benefits are likely to have upon local acceptability of less desirable energy 
generation facilities. The UK experience has demonstrated the potential for critical and 
cynical perspectives of community benefits to emerge (i.e. notions of ‘bribery’) and existing 
research has indicated that these critical framings can neutralise any potential increase in 
local support that might otherwise have resulted from the provision of community benefits. 
However, the current study has furthered these debates by demonstrating that if community 
benefits are portrayed as a policy requirement then they can increase local support for a 
potential offshore wind farm, even when local community members are aware that these have 
been portrayed (by some) as bribes. This effect was due to the heightening of perceptions of 
personal and collective benefit when the provision of community benefits was 
institutionalised rather than voluntary. A clear policy message can be extracted from the 
findings of this work – if communities are to believe that they are getting a ‘good deal’ 
through the siting of wind farms then this needs to come through government legislation and 
not discretionary acts by developers. Future work testing whether institutionalising 
community benefits can increase local support for other locally unwanted land uses, across 
different international environments and for projects in a downstream context would be 
valuable for policy makers, researchers, energy developers and communities alike. 
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Figure 1. Estimated marginal mean levels of support for the wind farm (1 = strongly oppose; 
7 = strongly support) (with standard error) across the framing conditions. 
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Figure 2. Results of the PROCESS mediational analysis that compares participant attitudes towards the wind farm under i) the institutionalised 
(Coded 1) vs voluntary framing conditions (Coded 0); and ii) the institutionalised (Coded 1) vs the no-framed condition (Coded 0). The reported 
path values are the unstandardized regression coefficient. The total effect of the framing condition upon support for the wind farm before the 
inclusion of potential mediators lies outside the parentheses. The direct effect of the framing condition after the inclusion of the potential 
mediators lies within the parentheses.
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Perceptions of personal benefit            
2 Perceptions of benefit for community .628**           
3 Perceptions of political bribery -.520** -.621**          
4 Perceptions of developer bribery -.447** -.550** .649**         
5 Age -.229** -.232** -.189* -.262**        
6 Level of developer trust .371** .544** -.566** -.596** -.152*       
7 Support for Wind Farm .683** .860** -.566** -.557** -.245* .533**  
Note *p<.05, **p<.01. 
Table 1. Correlations between the mediational, control and dependent variables.  
 
Notes 
i It should be noted that these newspapers are known for having a right wing ideology. 
ii Two questions also sought to measure whether participants perceived community benefits to be bribes by wind farm developers but did not have an acceptable reliability 
(spearman-brown r = .30). In hindsight this is likely to be due to the wording of one of the questions that asked participants for their agreement with the statement ‘I doubt 
that the reason wind farm developers provide community benefits is to ‘bribe’ local communities’, which had low consistency with other relevant measures. Consequently, it 
was deemed appropriate to use a single-item measure of perceptions of developer bribery. 
iii These statistics fall within recommended acceptance levels of VIF and tolerance (e.g. see Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black., 1995; Tabachnick & Fidell., 2001).	
																																								 																				
